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A cosmopolitan ethic invites both an appreciation of the rich diversity of values, traditions and ways
of life and a commitment to broad, universal principles of human rights that can secure the
flourishing of that diversity. Despite the tension between universalism and particularism inherent
in this outlook, it has received much recent attention in education. I focus here on one of the
dilemmas to be faced in taking cosmopolitanism seriously, namely, the difficulty of judging what
is just in the context of an increasingly divergent public—and classroom—discourse about values,
rights and equality. I propose in what follows that judgement cannot rely on any script, even one as
attractive, perhaps, as cosmopolitanism. To explore what is at stake in making judgements in
an educational context, I draw on both Hannah Arendt’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s notions of
judgement and thinking. The paper discusses the educational significance of thought and
judgement as conditions for reframing the universalism–particularism problem found in a
cosmopolitan ethic. My argument is that there is a world of difference between educating
for cosmopolitanism, which entails a faith in principles, and ‘thinking cosmopolitan’, which entails
a hope in justice for my neighbours.
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Introduction
Particular questions must receive particular answers; and if the series of crises in which we
have lived since the beginning of the century can teach us anything at all, it is, I think, the
simple fact that there are no general standards to determine our judgments unfailingly, no
general rules under which to subsume the particular cases with any degree of certainty.
(Hannah Arendt, 1966 speech, quoted in Arendt, 2003, p. vii)
What is inhuman is to be judged without there being anyone that judges. (Levinas,
1987, p. 40)
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Cosmopolitanism—an idea that has captured the Western imagination on and off
for the past 2000 years—is now enjoying a renaissance. Its current appearance on the
European scene occurs at a time when sensibilities around European belonging are
particularly keen. Despite the difficulty of defining it,1 cosmopolitanism comprises,
in both its historical and current invocations, a political and ethical mission to
embrace a sense of worldliness outside the confines of national belonging, where our
neighbours are no longer those who are ‘just like us’, but who exist in a global,
as opposed to a national, neighbourhood. It is a shift away from patriotism—‘the
virtue of the vicious,’ as Oscar Wilde once quipped—toward a new understanding of
our place and loyalties in the world. Thinkers such as Ulrich Beck (2006), Peter
Kemp (2005), and Karl-Otto Apel (2000) even posit that the future of Europe
depends upon our capacity to embrace a cosmopolitan ‘ethic’ and to begin to think
differently about our belonging in the world.2
But what constitutes the kind of thinking they are wishing Europeans to take up
in this ethic? And what difficulties does this raise for teachers who are being called
upon to educate youth along the lines of this ethic? Cosmopolitanism reveals a
commitment to notions of ‘world’, ‘transnational’ or ‘global’ citizenship, and also
frames its pursuit of global justice largely along two lines: universal rights, on the one
hand, and a respect for diversity, on the other, both of which trace their modern
lineage to Kant’s understanding of cosmopolitanism in his 1795 essay, Perpetual
Peace. A cosmopolitan ethic invites both an appreciation of the rich diversity of
values, traditions, and ways of life as part of the human condition and a commitment
to broad, universal principles that can secure the flourishing of that diversity.
In encouraging an openness toward others—their cultures, their values—and in
seeking justice that moves beyond the narcissism of the nation-state, a cosmopolitan
ethic has much to offer us in education, particularly those of us concerned with
the ethical dimensions of living in multicultural societies in an era marked
by globalization.3
Yet, I wish to raise two concerns here that are central for thinking about what
relationship a cosmopolitan ethic might have to education. The first one has not
so much to do with the inherent tension found within the ethic itself, but how it has
failed to be adequately addressed. That is, there is a simultaneous appeal to embrace
human rights (which entails a universalist ethic) and to respect cultural differences
(which entails an eminently more particularistic emphasis) within cosmopolitanism.
This double demand inevitably creates a contradictory logic that cannot be remedied
by emphasising one commitment over the other without, it seems to me, sacrificing
the project of cosmopolitanism itself.4 Rather than suggesting, as has been the
tendency with those who support cosmopolitanism, that human rights simply trump
all other cultural values as a condition of transnational belonging (e.g. Apel, 2000;
Anderson-Gold, 2001; Nussbaum, 2003; Kemp, 2005),5 I think this contradictory
logic is really begging a different ethical question: for is it not more a matter of how
we adjudicate in concrete circumstances, across our differences and in light of rights,
that is really at stake here? It seems to me that privileging rights on principle
denies the very cornerstone of human plurality upon which cosmopolitanism
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is usually grounded. Similarly, prioritising all aspects of diversity within cultures,
traditions, and beliefs over rights seems to land us in the proverbial relativist morasse.
My suggestion here is instead to make the difficulties of judgement itself a central
part of any cosmopolitan outlook.
My second concern has to do with this cosmopolitan ethic (or any ethic, for that
matter) becoming yet another script that teachers or anyone else should supposedly
recite, as though it held all the answers to our human predicament in the twenty-first
century. Teachers in particular are frequently bombarded with various kinds of
directives that are supposed either to ‘help’ their practice in becoming better teachers
or to be ‘implemented’ in the name of a better future. The problem with this
application model of theory to practice is that it risks leaving out of the equation the
here-and-now realities in which teachers are engaged, and it also risks encouraging
an uncritical—dare I say thoughtless—stance toward those ideas that are meant to be
implemented. With the case of the inherent contradiction within cosmopolitanism,
this is particularly evident in terms of how teachers negotiate reconciling their
commitment to respecting the diversity of values and traditions with their
commitment to universal principles. My point is that if we are going to concede
that cosmopolitanism has something important to say with regard to how education
might be rethought beyond the nation-state, then it behoves us to consider the whole
question of how teachers might live justly within the aporetic space created by a
dual commitment to transnational, universal principles of human rights and
an attentiveness to the unsettling play of cultural and social diversity.
I focus here on one of the dilemmas to be faced in taking cosmopolitanism
seriously, namely the difficulty of judging what is just in the context of an increasingly
divergent public—and classroom—discourse about values, rights and equality.
In other words, how might judgement help us to think differently about the relation
between education and cosmopolitanism beyond the script of a cosmopolitan ethic?
I propose in what follows that everyday teaching practices and the difficulties
of judgement that teachers face are themselves tied already to what Kant referred to
as our ‘cosmopolitan existence’. In this sense, teaching can be seen as being
implicated in a cosmopolitan approach, as opposed to being the vehicle through which
a cosmopolitan ethic is implemented. To explore what is at stake in making
judgements in an educational context, I draw on both Hannah Arendt’s and
Emmanuel Levinas’s notions of judgement and thinking. What both emphasise is the
strong connection between our capacity for thought and our capacity to judge as
conditions arising from human plurality, from our ‘cosmopolitan existence’. As Kant
himself identified, cosmopolitanism as an expression of respecting diversity and
according others absolute rights demands a capacity for ‘enlarged mentality’, or, in
other words, a capacity to think beyond oneself in order to judge. Thus, what
I explore here is the educational significance of thought and judgement as conditions
for reframing the universalism-particularism problem found in a cosmopolitan ethic.
My argument is that there is a world of difference between educating for
cosmopolitanism, which entails a faith in principles, and ‘thinking cosmopolitan’,
which entails an aspiration for justice for my neighbours. Indeed, by placing thinking
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at the heart of judgement, I wish to mobilise a notion of thought that resists scripts,
even those as seductive as cosmopolitanism. For the question remains, how do we
promote a particular project of global justice without turning it into a prosthesis
for thinking?
Teaching, judging, thinking
There are two aspects of teaching and judging I wish to draw out here in order to
situate them in relation to cosmopolitanism: first, that teaching is inherently involved
in making judgements; and secondly, that judgement is central to justice. With
respect to the former, the judgement of teachers is perhaps most obvious in matters
of assessment and evaluation; but it is in facing the range of human diversity in their
classrooms that teachers’ judgements are an everyday matter, constantly deciding,
evaluating, comparing and prioritising students’ competing individual demands and
needs. More often than not, such judgements happen without much reflection: the
immediacy of their required response often does not allow teachers much time for
thinking. Instead, relying on well-worn strategies and rules of engagement, teachers
frequently perform their professional role like a character in an old, familiar play.
Such rules help teachers to respond quickly, efficiently; and I certainly appreciate the
need for teachers to do so. However, strictly speaking, a judgement is precisely that
which cannot be made by adhering, relatively unthinkingly, to a rule or principle.
It requires decision, by a singular subject, by a teacher as an individual who, in her
particular encounters with others, says ‘I decide’. Thus it is not a role we are talking
about when we talk about judgement in this sense, but a person who, although a
professional and part of a profession, makes decisions in all her singularity. Indeed,
in my experience, teachers frequently discuss these differences in decision-making
in terms of the tensions they face in the classroom between making decisions as
teachers and making decisions as ‘persons’. It is as though the role at times speaks
through them as opposed to their speaking through the role. But at the end of the
day, to echo Levinas, roles do not judge; there is something inhuman about claiming
that there is no one, no person, who judges.
Regarding the second point, judgement is also that which is a necessary, if difficult,
condition of justice, thus making the practice of judging in teaching a practice
of justice as well. Judgements are statements of our prioritised responsibilities and of
the results of our weighing the elements of a situation in order to reach a verdict.
They say something about us to the world, and thus signal our own implication in it.
That is, being able to decide who speaks when and to whom; giving priority over one
student’s story over another’s; judging the truth value of what a student is telling you;
deciding whether or not to punish a particular act of disobedience; assessing when
a student’s behaviour warrants a call home; protecting one student from harm at
the hands of others; judging how to respond to disruption; deciding if a particular
behaviour is racist or sexist, and if so, how to handle it—all these and more illustrate
times when our judgements as teachers are actually partaking of something more
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than general rules or regulations can account for. They are decisions made about
particular cases, which at the very least require interpretation of rules, and at most
sometimes demand abandoning them altogether. As Arendt has warned us, if we
have learned anything from the horrors of the twentieth century, it is not to put so
much faith and trust in rules as the safeguards to our actions. Instead, what we need
to reflect on is how judgement demands thinking beyond the standard scripts. That
is, to think about our roles as opposed to letting those roles determine our thinking.
This is particularly acute when it comes to a seemingly benevolent script such as
cosmopolitanism, for it simply cannot provide the answers it sometimes professes
to be able to offer. This means we need to reconsider what is at stake in
our judgements as teachers with respect to others, and it means assessing the place
of thinking in judgement more generally.
Lessons from evil
No philosopher has generated as much controversy, perhaps, as Hannah Arendt
has done with her phrase ‘the banality of evil’. A discussion on the place of thinking
in judgement ironically must begin with this and its appearance in Arendt’s report
on the notorious 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann. Arendt claims in a postscript written
a year after the initial publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem (Arendt, 1994) that she
was merely offering an account ‘strictly on the factual level’ of phenomena she
witnessed daily at the trial in coining the phrase. Here, Arendt for the first time
develops the idea that it is the sheer inability to think that enables someone to
perpetrate evil acts. No demoniacal possession, no diabolical depth: Arendt
attributes simply (!) a thoughtlessness, a superficiality, and a ‘remoteness from
reality’ (Arendt, 1994, p. 288) to Eichmann’s comportment throughout the trial, and
in particular the detached way in which he used language, unthinkingly parroting
stock phrases without any sense of what they seemed to be signifying. Arendt notes
that even at the gallows, moments before his execution by hanging, Eichmann’s
last words to the world are a series of contradictory cliche´s strung together.
As Shoshana Felman (2002) notes, ‘Eichmann does not speak the borrowed (Nazi)
language: he is rather spoken by it, spoken for by its cliche´s, whose criminality he does
not come to realize’ (p. 213).
It is precisely this chilling inability to recognise human consequences, to weigh and
to judge authentically beyond a mere parroting of rules, that is, for Arendt, one of the
hallmarks of Nazi Germany. Although Arendt identified evil in all its banality, she did
not assume that evil was ordinary; neither did she think that it did not have a unique
human face. The danger with asserting that ‘there is an Eichmann in us all’, or that
one was merely following orders (what Arendt refers to as the ‘cog-theory of evil’),
or that one shouldn’t judge ‘lest ye be judged’ or that one cannot judge because one
wasn’t there, is the assumption that there is no unique agent—and therefore, nothing
human—about the deeds being committed. Indeed, ironically, these ideas fall in
precisely with Eichmann’s defence: that evil deeds are not committed by a person,
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but that a person’s role is merely the vehicle through which such deeds are enacted
(if it was not me, then it would be someone else—what Zygmunt Bauman refers to
as responsibility ‘floated’ [1993, p. 18]). Arendt is adamant that it is the individual
who is to be judged and that judging requires seeing the one being judged in her or
his humanity. Indeed, commenting on the apparent fear people seem to have about
judging, Arendt claims that ‘behind the unwillingness to judge lurks the suspicion
that no one is a free agent, and hence the doubt that anyone is responsible or could
be expected to answer for what he has done’ (Arendt, 2003, p. 19).
The Eichmann case taught Arendt two important lessons: that the absence
of independent thought in relation to words, to rules, to standards, leads to a failure
of judgement and that the apparent easiness of this absence should indicate a deep
suspicion about how rules and standards themselves function. With respect to the
latter point, she writes:
[I]t was as though morality, at the very moment of its total collapse within an old and
highly civilized nation, stood revealed in the original meaning of the word, as a set of
mores, of customs and manners, which could be exchanged for another set with no
more trouble than it would take to change the table manners of a whole people. (Arendt,
2003, p. 43)
Thus, for Arendt, it is perilous to be complacent and take any rules or standards
at face value; she claims that we need ‘to start thinking and judging instead of
applying categories and formulas which are deeply engrained in our mind . . .’
(Arendt, 2003, p. 37). Insofar as general rules of morality are ‘taught and learned
until they grow into habits’ (Arendt, 2003, p. 189), they will always risk leading us
awry unless we have the ability to consider the particular case from outside the terms
of the universal. So, for Arendt, it is not so much that thoughtlessness leads to bad
judgement: rather, it leads to no judgement at all.
Before moving on, I want to sum up what I see, in turn, as Arendt’s lessons for
education: first, that we would do well to think better of educating values as ‘habits of
mind’ (including those cosmopolitan values that we find compelling) for, even when
we think our values are best, we must recognise that we are not necessarily educating
for thinking; and secondly, that making judgements, in Arendt’s sense of the word,
requires us to think, which means that judgements must be re-personalised even as
they are made within the context of our roles as teachers. Thus, Arendt challenges
the idea that education can ever be the fulfilment of an ‘-ism’—at least not without
risking thoughtlessness, and perhaps even evil. But how are judgements made
exactly, and what has this to do with thinking and promoting more just relations
to others, both within and outside the classroom?
Thinking for judgement
At first blush, it is easy to see how thinking and judgement might be linked here.
One reflects on the standards or the rules one is called upon to use in order to inform
one’s decisions about what to do with particular cases. To some degree, this is the
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relation Arendt proposes; but it is not the whole story. For do not thinking and
judgement actually do different things?
In depicting how judgements are made, Arendt wishes to move out from
underneath the history of philosophy—and religion—which centres the self as a
unified entity isolated from others in making judgements. Taking issue with such
prescriptions as ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself ’, Arendt sees that there is a type of
narcissism at play: the self as centre of the world as opposed to the self as being in
the world with others. So, although she proposes that ‘morality concerns the
individual in his singularity’ (Arendt, 2003, p. 97), it is a funny sort of singularity in
that the self exists in the plural: I am ‘I’ as I appear to others, and I am also ‘myself’
to myself. Thus being different is part of the very nature of the self—all things
identical with themselves are at the same time different from what they are not.6
Thinking, for Arendt, is therefore the conversation the ‘I’ has with itself.
It needs no others to engage with; it is, in fact, a necessary retreat from the world
of appearances. Thinking is not an activity like others, like an action upon the world,
but an internal conversation that has the job of representing to the self things in
the abstract: it deals with invisibles. Moreover, thinking does not lead to any ‘solid
axioms’. As Arendt writes, ‘we cannot expect any moral propositions or
commandments, no final code of conduct from the thinking activity, least of all a
new and now allegedly final definition of what is good and what is evil’ (Arendt,
2003, p. 167). Thinking is a meditation, a resultless enterprise not fixated on
deliberating, or reaching conclusions. It examines unceasingly all creeds, supposi-
tions, standards, and rules. In this sense, thinking poses a danger to established
thought. Yet, the alternative cannot lie in discouraging thinking:
By shielding people against the dangers of examination, it teaches them to hold fast
to whatever the prescribed rules of conduct may be at a given time in a given society.
What people then get used to is not so much the content of the rules . . . as the possession
of rules under which to subsume particulars. (2003, p. 178)
The radicality of Arendt’s conception of thinking lies in the acknowledgement that
thinking ‘does society little good . . . it does not create values, it will not find out, once
and for all, what ‘‘the good’’ is, and it does not confirm but rather dissolves accepted
rules of conduct’ (2003, p. 188). This begs the question of how we reconcile thinking
with judgement when the latter seems to be very much about deciding as opposed
to restlessly ruminating.
Judgement is not about invisibles, but is concerned with actual persons and
circumstances. It is the arbiter of right and wrong in particular cases. Judgement
requires that I take others into account, and although I do not conform to their
judgements (indeed blindly doing so would not be judgement at all), Arendt is clear
that judgement is not purely subjective. I do not simply take my own thinking into
account, but those others who are prepared to judge themselves. It is here that
Arendt establishes the importance of community between fellow judges. Thus, it is
with them that I am in a community of common sense—what Arendt, following
Kant, calls ‘the mother of judgement’. It is this intersubjectivity that keeps
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judgement alive, and not the solo performance of the thinking ego. Judgement is,
quite simply, an engagement in a world rich with diversity; it is a cosmopolitan
activity. Commenting on Kant, Arendt writes: ‘One judges always as a member of
a community, guided by one’s community sense, one’s sensus communis. But in the
last analysis, one is a member of a world community by the sheer fact of being
human; this is one’s ‘‘cosmopolitan existence’’’ (Arendt, 1992, p. 75).
So, how could thinking be related to judgement if the former is always about
invisibles, the latter about particular, lived circumstances in a manifold human
landscape, a specifically cosmopolitan landscape? Arendt claims that judgement is the
‘by-product of the liberating effect of thinking’ (Arendt, 2003, p. 189); thinking kicks
off, as it were, this engagement with the world. It is thus that judgement becomes
a realization of thinking (Arendt, 2003, p. 188): it is in this sense both determinant
and reflexive. Nevertheless, it is not clear to me why thinking has such power to
jump-start the faculty of judgement. Indeed, it is not clear how the solitariness
of thinking lends itself to the social, intersubjective sphere of judging. What moves
me out of my solitude to come back to the world and offer my judgement?7 Given
that Arendt’s claim is that judgement requires thought to mobilize it—for without
thought, we are back to non-judgement and evil—there is a piece missing from
her picture that distorts, I think, the place judgement has in our relations to others.
It is a particularly important relation that, in my view, has vital consequences for
teaching in general and for ‘thinking cosmopolitan’ in particular.
The provocation of the other
I believe Arendt is correct in assuming that thinking is a dangerous, critical
enterprise, particularly in times of moral and political conformity. And I agree that
thinking is, at least in part, a resultless, restless conversation that I have with myself,
and is, by its nature, not of society in the same way that our other activities are.
Yet, although I might think in solitude, I want to challenge the idea that thinking
derives wholly from myself. Arendt was correct in identifying that alterity, or
difference, is fundamental to the internal conversation, but in my view that alterity
comes from something exterior to the self—it is precisely what is not-me that enables
conversation—whether that conversation happens internally or otherwise. I want to
spend a little time on this here, drawing on the work of Levinas, in order to develop
the view that it is precisely because thought comes from the other and not from
myself that thinking can be seen to be essential to judgement, and to justice more
generally.
It is perhaps helpful to begin this tack with a depiction of what thinking is not.
Levinas (1987) writes: ‘A particular being can take itself to be a totality only if it is
thoughtless. Not that it is deceiving itself or thinking badly or foolishly; it is not
thinking’ (p. 25). This particular being that does not think is what Levinas (1987)
calls a living being—a being who lives in ‘ignorance of the exterior world’ (p. 25) and
who experiences the world only through sensation (p. 26); it is, in short,
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the biological being whose inner world is undisturbed by the messiness of the outside
world around it, its consciousness remaining without problems. ‘This consciousness
is not concerned with situating itself relative to an exteriority, does not grasp itself
as part of the whole (for it precedes all grasping); it is a consciousness to which the
term the unconscious . . . or instinct corresponds’ (Levinas, 1987, p. 26). The portrait
of being that Levinas paints here does not represent an actual person who lives
entirely in thoughtlessness, but rather depicts an aspect of the ego whose tendency
is to totalise its reality, to see its reality as an extension of itself.
In contrast to this, Levinas situates the thinking being as one who is not only in and
of the world, but who also recognises that world as exterior to it. Thus a thinking
being is one whose inwardness is dependent upon the presence of another: the inner
world is inner because there is an exterior world from which it is distinct, and to
which it is opposed. Thought ‘establishes a relationship with an exteriority which
is not assumed. Qua thinker man is the one for whom the exterior world exists. From
that moment on, his so-called biological life, his strictly inward life, is illuminated
with thought’ (Levinas, 1987, p. 27). One might say that ‘man’ is a totality no longer.
The ability to think, then, is set in motion by something outside oneself, not, as in
Arendt, by an interior split. As Levinas (1987) writes, ‘thought begins with the
possibility of conceiving a freedom external to my own . . . [Indeed] conceiving of
a freedom external to my own is the first thought’ (p. 28). What it means to think,
for Levinas, is a consciousness of my outer world, a consciousness that others exist
independently of me, a taking in of something unfamiliar and new. Moreover,
consciousness itself is not possible without this exteriority.
Thought thus enables a relation between two, the self and the other, whereas
thoughtlessness remains contained within the one, the same. With thinking
established as that which is fundamentally connected to alterity—to a radical
difference, to a not-me—Levinas simultaneously establishes the ethical character
of judgement: the I or ego is susceptible to others in the outside world, to what lies
exterior to it. It cannot think without the disruption that only an exterior relation can
provide. So although the consequence of thinking may indeed be the conversation
one has with oneself, that conversation is provoked into existence by otherness and
is not self-constituting.
Recognising that we do not exist simply as I and other in the world, Levinas
introduces the term ‘third party’ to formulate the link between thinking and
judgement, or justice. This third party is the referent to human plurality which marks
our social and political life. The third is the other’s other, the other’s neighbour,
and hence my own neighbour as well. With this admission comes the difficult task
of having to prioritise my attention and my responsibility with respect to my
neighbours, in the plural. What was once an ethical responsibility, a total openness to
the unique other, the third party, pulls me away from ‘this proximity . . . away from
responsibility prior to all judgment’ (Levinas, 1998, p. 195). Thus this necessity to
judge founds thinking; it compels us to evaluate, compare, and thematise. We are
already in the realm of justice as we think.
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Thus what do we think about as we judge? What kinds of considerations do we
need to take into account, and what is it that we give up when we judge? It is worth
quoting Levinas (1996) at length here:
Doubtless, responsibility for the other human being is, in its immediacy, anterior to every
question. But how does responsibility obligate if a third party troubles this exteriority of
two where my subjection of the subject is subjection to the neighbor? The third party
is other than the neighbor but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other,
and not simply their fellow. What am I to do? What have they already done to one
another? Who passes before the other in my responsibility? What, then, are the other and
the third party with respect to one another? Birth of the question.
. . .Comparison is superimposed onto my relation with the unique and incomparable,
and, in view of equity and equality, a weighing, a thinking, a calculation, the comparison
of incomparables . . . the necessity of thinking together under a synthetic theme . . . and
through this, finally, the extreme importance in human multiplicity of the political
structure of society, subject to laws and institutions . . . (Levinas, 1996, p. 168)
In Levinas’s view, then, judgement does not have to be kick-started by thinking, for
thinking is already caught up in the bonds of responsible justice by virtue of the self ’s
encounter with exteriority. We can see here, then, that the thinking subject is one
who of necessity betrays the ethical covenant of infinite responsibility even as that
covenant informs how justice ought to guide our judgements. Justice, for Levinas, is
thus an ideal for thought (elsewhere I have discussed this ideal in terms of Lyotard’s
interpretation of Kant8) which nonetheless grows out of the initial obligation the
I has for the other. And it is I, the thinker, who has unique responsibility in the
plurality of human faces, in the multitude of neighbours. It is the suffering, now,
of my neighbours and not just the singular other, which moves me to judgement.
As Richard Cohen has remarked, ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself ’ is transformed
by Levinas into ‘Love thy neighbour is thyself ’.
So, as with Arendt, adherence to rules or standards is not part of the substantive
nature of justice for Levinas. Justice, although an ideal, has no content. It cannot tell
us what to decide, it can merely inform us that, through a reminder of the initial
obligation that we have for the other, we merely must decide. Thus it is not that
universal principles, such as respect or human rights, have no meaning; rather that
they cannot provide the content of our decisions: just as Catherine Chalier (2002)
has noted with respect to Levinas, contra Kant, ‘universal philosophical concepts are
put to the test of singularity’ (Chalier, 2002, p. 83). So, as Levinas claims, ‘respect is
not the result of justice . . .The one respected is not the one to whom, but the one
with whom one renders justice’ (Levinas, 1987, p. 43). Again with Arendt, Levinas
posits the intersubjective element of justice as a co-endeavour amongst equal subjects
who always must be reminded that I am singularly responsible to unique others and
their suffering.
In this sense, then, I read thinking as central in judgement not only because
of what thinking can do (critique, challenge, reflect), but that it does so
fundamentally in relation to human plurality. Thinking has a fundamentally
cosmopolitan quality. Thought is therefore not simply a flight into solitude, but a
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relation across radical difference where my thinking is enabled by the provocation
of others. This means that although thinking is a distinct form of conversation,
it nonetheless is occasioned by the conscious recognition of exteriority and the
freedom of others. Thus both Arendt and Levinas are right in asserting that rules or
standards (morality, quite simply) are not the stuff of judgement; rather it is the
unique thinker who is responsible for the judgements she makes.
Thinking cosmopolitan in education
In proposing that ‘thinking cosmopolitan’ provides us with some insight into
judgement, I am wary of promoting yet another rule or standard against which
teachers evaluate their own judgements. Instead, I think we would do well to think,
rather, of judgements as moments that fix thinking in time, that implicate teachers in
the here and now of their work. For judgement is, ultimately, about implication: it is
a definite decision that breaks with the duration of thought. And it reveals precisely
the point where teachers feel the pull between the professional and the personal most
profoundly: judgement commits ‘me’ to something. There is a basic paradox to be
faced in teaching when it comes to judgement, for if judgement is that which exceeds
rules and devotes itself to particular cases, then it is clear that teachers must perform
as teachers in ways that cannot do justice to others. By this I mean that teachers’
decisions often are made in the context of the rules of the profession and the culture
of the school, with the result that the particularities of a case are neglected in the
exigency of coming to a decision. Thought is not always possible in teaching.
But how much thoughtlessness can we tolerate, and how much can we hide behind
the veil our professional roles afford us?
It seems clear that where we draw that line has precisely to do with personal, not
professional, judgement. It is not that all professional judgement is an unthinking
reliance on rules and standards. Indeed, I would hope that a notion of the
professional, of the teacher’s role itself, could allow for the paradoxes and tensions
teachers often experience. Moreover, I would hope too that that role could also
incorporate personal aspects of the teacher herself. But, in cases of a sensitive nature,
such as cultural conflict, for example, where a cosmopolitan ethic cannot provide us
with a useful guide, then we also seem to require a much fuller language for how we
make judgements in ways that do not forget the face of justice in the process. For it is
precisely here where teachers are most likely to fall back on routine and procedure
in an attempt to escape the discomfort and unease that conflicts entail.
Given the kind of work teachers do, there is often not a lot of time for thinking and
so we need to reflect on how we can propose a thoughtful orientation to our
judgements; that is, to think about our roles, as opposed to letting those roles
determine our thinking. Such a thoughtfulness, whose nature I hope has now
become clear, refuses both the simplicity of self-righteous moralising and the
anonymity provided by standards and rules. It is a thoughtfulness that carries within
it a cosmopolitan sense: a thought that is born from others who are my neighbours.
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And so, how do teachers carry out judgements concerning complex matters of
values, rights and equality, for instance, without falling back unthinkingly on abstract
rules? It seems to me that ‘thinking cosmopolitan’, as opposed to ‘thinking according
to cosmopolitanism’, allows us some room for acknowledging the ideal of justice that
prevails in making judgements and puts human diversity at the centre of what too
often appears to be a solitary enterprise. For cosmopolitanism, it seems to me,
is precisely about an openness to the indefinite; and if we are going to attempt to
inaugurate forms of belonging that resist the narrow nationalisms that have thus far
shaped so much educational content, then it means having to think ‘without
a banister’, as Arendt was fond of saying (cited in Arendt, 2003, p. xxxvii). And this
includes even those banisters—like cosmopolitanism—that we believe actually might
be of the most help.
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Notes
1. Breckenridge et al. (2002) write, ‘specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitively is
an uncosmopolitan thing to do’ (p. 1), precisely because it invokes an openness to the
indefinite and gestures to an unknown ‘beyond’ of the nation-state.
2. Although I am focusing here on the specifically European features of cosmopolitanism,
I also wish to draw readers’ attention to the way this discourse is not necessarily purely
western. See, for example, Zubaida (2002) and van der Veer (2002) in Vertovec and Cohen
(2002) for discussions of cosmopolitanism outside the west. My use of the term ‘ethic’ here is
not meant to suggest that all writers who advocate for cosmopolitanism do so under the name
of an ‘ethic’, but they do commonly agree on a shared set of values that are central to their
cosmopolitan outlook, and it is this to which I am referring: world citizenship, empathy with
global ‘neighbours’, commitment to human rights, respect for human diversity in all its
manifestations.
3. Martha Nussbaum (2003), for one, interweaves this attention to cultural pluralism with a
commitment to universal principles of human rights in her call for educational reform.
Moreover, calls for global or world citizenship in education which similarly take up the twin
projects of human rights and respect for cultural diversity have proliferated in recent years
(Osler and Starkey, 2003; Noddings, 2004; Kemp, 2005).
4. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Todd (in press). Also, Derrida (2002) identifies yet
another contradictory imperative within cosmopolitanism: conditional and unconditional
hospitality. The latter is that which cosmopolitanism offers to all people, regardless of origin
or residence; the former is the inevitable limitations placed upon one’s right of residence in a
specific territory, land, or state.
5. For differences within the literature on cosmopolitanism, see for example Derek Heater’s
(2002) discussion, which takes a more equivocal position and focuses on the pros and
cons of cosmopolitan and communitarian arguments with respect to world citizenship.
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Appiah (2006), in his discussion of cosmopolitanism and its ethical dimensions, focuses on
commonalities across differences (particularly with respect to certain ‘universal’ values)
and makes appeals to ‘humanity’ without sufficiently addressing the specific tensions
between rights and human pluralism that inevitably arise when discussions are forged on
how and who is to decide on what is common between us.
6. See Arendt’s discussion on these points in more detail in the first book of The life of the
mind: Thinking (1978).
7. Although Arendt (1978) discusses in Willing, the second book in The life of the mind, that the I
returns to the world in action where ‘a We is always engaged in changing our common world,
stands in the sharpest possible opposition to the solitary business of thought, which operates
in a dialogue between me and myself ’ (p. 200), she nonetheless does not attribute to the Will
the capacity to aid in making judgements. Will, though central to Arendt’s conception of
political action and freedom, is little discussed in direct relation to the connection between
thinking and judgement.
8. See Todd (2007).
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